This paper introduces a self-protection structure for computing system. The proposed structure aims to detect, classify and protect against DoS attacks. This architecture utilizes a model-based decision approach that continuously monitors for system parameters relevant to its security and quality of service. The proposed structure is implemented here on a distributed system comprising of a set of routers, front VMs and hosts on which online monitoring sensors, data preprocessing filters, intrusion detection systems, and model-based controllers are implemented. The functionality of the security management approach is evaluated through the experiment. The results show that this approach is successful in dealing with known and unknown DoS attacks automatically and efficiently.
Introduction
Autonomic computing systems adapt to changes in their environment, and reconfigure their resources accordingly. An autonomous system typically requires continuous monitoring of system state, operating conditions, as well as internal and external inputs or events. These measurements are used together with a model describing the system behavior to adjust the system parameters and control its resources to achieve optimal performance with no or little human intervention [1] . Self-configuration, self-optimization, self-protection and self-healing are four attributes of autonomic computing systems. However, it is not necessary for an autonomic system to contain all of the four attributes. The system may be autonomic in one aspect and not in another [2] .
In this paper we address the self-protection aspect of autonomic computing. To this end, we develop a security management architecture that contains the online monitoring system, the data pre-processing module, the intrusion detection system (IDS), and the model-based controller. We implement this architecture for testing and evaluation using a simulation of an enterprise system containing routers, front virtual machines (VMs) and host servers. This enterprise system is able to detect known and unknown network attacks; protect against specific attacks by optimized protection methods. Attack detection, system protection and recovery are coordinated automatically using a model-based control module. Four types of Denial of Service (DoS) attacks are simulated to test the security management approach [3] .
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents previous literature related to our work. Section 3 introduces modules and techniques of the specific model-based security management structure executed in the router, the front VM, and the host. Section 4 presents the simulation results about various phases of detection, classification, optimization, and protection of four types of DoS attacks. Experiment results show that the management technology can protect the server against both known and unknown attacks. Section 5 discusses the extension and advantages of autonomic security management approach. The conclusion and future work are presented in section 6.
Related Work
Denial of Service attacks saturate system and network resources by launching flooding-based attacks with congested network traffic. This form of attack sends a large amount of network datagram or packets within a short period of time to the victim server and impedes legitimate users access to resources of the server by exhausting network buffers, CPU processing cycles, available memory, and network bandwidth [4] , which leads eventually to a degraded system performance and slows the response time to legitimate users.
Most of the current research in network security focuses on detection and classification of attacks. Only a few research groups establish a defense system by using autonomic security management approaches. These approaches integrate attack detections, attack classifications, optimized protection responses, and automatic system recovery. Autonomic security mechanism is applied to detect active and passive network attacks based on virtual neurons and feature recognition [5] . A multi-level IDS (ML-IDS) is introduced in [6] , which is controlled and managed automatically. The ML-IDS first collects data, then after training the monitored measurements, detection algorithm is applied to identify real time network attacks. The ML-IDS also allows the autonomic system to be interacted by the decision of system administrators.
Although there are not enough literature that discuss self-protection mechanisms in the context of network attacks, IDS and protection methods are usually used in autonomic computing systems. There are different ways to select parameters used in IDS for detecting and classifying DoS attacks. Previous literature related to IDS pays attention to measure packet control information, payloads, windows sizes, TTL and response time. Parameters of packet control information, such as Ethernet header, IP header, TCP header, UDP header, and ICMP header are relative attributes to attack detection [7] . Scanning the payload of traffic packets is considered as an effective technique to detect DoS attack because the illegitimate packets are easy to be distinguished from known legitimate payloads [8] . However, features of host like CPU, memory utilization as well as the number of packets are influenced when the host is compromised by DoS attacks [9] . Therefore, authors in [10] suggest monitoring features like the packet rate, packet inter-arrival time, the size of arriving packet, and total flow bytes.
Generally, statistical techniques such as Naive Bayesian Classifiers and Markov models as well as data mining approaches like decision trees and regression analysis are helpful to design detection engines. A hidden Markov model (HMM) is used in [11] for monitoring system calls and training anomalous sequences. Naive Bayesian Classifier in [12] is able to detect attacks with small-size training data and a large number of attributes. A decision tree based approach is used in [12] . Attack data classified by executing this approach has the highest accuracy rate compared to Ripper Rule, Back-Propagation Neural Network, and Radial Basis Function Neural Network. In [7] the authors introduce the anomaly detection technique and the misuse detection technique to improve the accuracy of detection mechanism and reduce false alarm rate. Two detection techniques combined together is called hybrid detection technique which is able to detect novel attacks and classify known attacks.
In the proposed security management structure the underlying IDS adopts both the hybrid detection techniques and the data mining techniques with the combination of the expert system to detect attacks through features of the system and the network utilization. Four detection engines are used to detect and classify attacks, and the type of attack is decided by the engine which has the highest accuracy rate. For these reasons the accuracy rate of the attack identification and the classification made by the IDS is higher than 99%.
The reactive mechanism is one of the DoS attack defense mechanisms [13] . This mechanism responds to the attacks by controlling packets rate, locating agent machines and even invoking administrator actions. Authors in [13] divide DoS attacks into several classes and discuss mechanisms specific to each class. Locating agent machines is a technique used to protect against spoofing-based DoS attacks. The most successful approaches to defend nonspoofing-based DoS attacks are filtering and rate-limiting packet redirection. The Turing test is applied to distinguish users from machines. As a result, malicious requests are eliminated and only legitimate users are able to access limited resources of the server. To discard flow from illegitimate users, the trusted platform module is suggested to be installed on the host server so that only registered users are allowed to send request packets to the server when the server is compromised [14] . Intrusion prevention system (IPS) responds to intrusions through a combination of the firewall and IDS [15] . One example of an open source network IPS is the Snort inline mode [16] . As Snort inline defends against DoS attacks in real time, it is used as one of protection methods in our design. Figure 1 shows an implementation of the security management structure composed of three main components: the router, the front VM and the host (web server). Packets sent from different networks pass through the router first. Usually packets are forwarded to the final destination (host) after the router chooses the best path. In our structure, before the router forwards the network flow to the host, it pre-routes packets to the front VM where IDS is able to detect whether the suspicious flows are attacks or not. If an attack is identified, decision engines in IDS-Identifier are used to classify the attack type. The controller which is installed on the VM then selects the optimal action to protect the system based on the type of attacks and the host states.
Security Management Structure
The model-based controller at the front VM contains the recovery unit, the optimization unit, and the recovery ranking unit. The recovery unit applies various protection processes including IPS, port disablement, legitimate flow filtering, network disconnection, and host shutdown. The optimization unit evaluates recovery processes, and selects the optimal action (or sequence of actions) for a specific attack and host state. To deal with potential misclassification of suspicious flow and zero-day attacks, the host has its own anomaly IDS. When the front VM shows a 'Normal' condition and the host is identified by its own IDS as 'Abnormal', then an unknown attack has been directly forwarded from the router to the host before being redirected to the protected VM. In this case, the recovery ranking unit examines the signatures of attack packets and selects the best protection technique using the model-based controller. Details of the structure are discussed in the remaining of this section.
Intrusion Detection System
The basic idea behind most IDSs is to identify the patterns of the legitimate system utilization and distinguish them from anomalous ones [17] . IDS can be categorized into the host-based and the network-based. In our work, we use two hybrid IDSs which combine both host-based and network-based IDSs. One of the IDSs is installed on the front VM and the other located on the host. These two IDSs use different techniques to detect attacks. The IDS on host uses anomaly detection technique while the IDS on VM uses both anomaly and misuse detection techniques.
Monitored Variables
Training data of IDSs is usually composed of connection and traffic measurements supplied by KDD CUP 1999 [18] . However, our training data combines system and network features to detect and classify potentially suspicious flows. Measurements such as system available memory (KB), total bytes received or sent per second through the network adapter, total number of packets received or sent per second through the network adapter, total number of read or write requests per second issued to physical devices, percentage of time that the CPU is idle, percentage of CPU system level utilization and CPU user level utilization are collected by a real-time and fault-tolerant distributed system monitor (RFDMon) [19] .
In our experiment we consider the set A of flow types where, A = {UDP Flood, TCP SYN, ICMP Flood, POD, Normal}. We will use the initial letter to distinguish each attribute with proper formula context. The system state is defined by the set F of attributes where, F = {available memory, received bytes, sent bytes, received packets, sent packets, IO read, IO write, CPU idle time, CPU process time, CPU user time}.
Let V x = {V 1 x , . . . , V R x } be a sequence of R measurements vectors collected for each of the above features under a flow type x ∈ A settings (we use the first letter for the flow type, for instance, N denotes Normal). As we are using machine learning techniques for attack classification, V x will be a set of training data used as input to the classification algorithm. We will write v 
The difference between collected training values and the average values of each feature in 'Normal' case is denoted △ j i,N and is defined as follows. The average values for the other flow types are computed similarly.
The set of values {△ j i,x |j ∈ [1, R]} is saved for each feature i ∈ F and flow type x ∈ A to build the training model.
Detection Model
The IDS at the front VM contains an anomaly detector and an identifier (for applying misuse detection technique). Collected data (contains 8498 datasets) is used within Naive Bayesian Classifier to compute the training model for classifying attacks. The accuracy rate of the attack identification used by the training model is about 99%. This accuracy rate is higher than rates classified by other three techniques (HMM, the decision tree, and regression).
In our experiment, the attack type with the largest probability is identified as the cause for suspicious flow. The number of test data sets are classified into a flow type x ∈ A as defined by a map M : A → ℜ. For example, M (U ) is the number of test data classified as UDP flood attack. We write P max to denote the maximum probability of testing data to be a particular flow type.
where N is the total number of test data sets. Suppose 12 out of 20 testing sets are predicted as UDP flood attack, while 2 testing data sets are predicted as TCP SYN, 3 as ICMP, 2 as POD and 1 as Normal. Then M = {12,2,3,2,1}. In this case P max is 0.6. Accordingly, the flow type is considered UDP flood attack. The IDS at the host uses anomaly detection technique to classify suspicious flows as either 'Normal' or 'Abnormal' by comparing current values to thresholds of training features defined by the administrator. In our experiment, we computed the average value of each feature of the host in the 'Normal' state. We set the thresholds to be 20% higher than the average normal values when the client request workloads are random.
Threshold features are not independent (the increment of packet rate influences the parameters of total bytes). Accordingly, we will need several parameters to identify the host as either 'Normal' or 'Abnormal'. Considering all of the ten features, however, is impossible, since various attacks have influence on different features. Some of the features are not affected at all. For instance, DoS attacks do not effect the I/O read or write requests significantly. We consider the host 'Abnormal' if any four out of ten feature values are higher than their thresholds. These threshold values of measurements and the definition of system's abnormal behavior depend on web server's security document like STIG [20].
Model-Based Controller
This controller chooses which protection method can be used to protect the host against attacks. The model-based controller takes into account flow types, host states and efficiency of the protection method. Unknown attacks discovered by the host IDS will further be classified into their categories and be prevented using dynamic analysis.
Recovery Unit
The recovery unit is responsible for installing and configuring protection processes. In this implementation we consider the following protection methods.
• IPS: Snort inline [21] is used to protect the host server against DoS attacks. With Snort inline, network packets with destination IP addresses and ports that match pre-defined rules are stored temporally into ip queue-a standard queue handler for IPv4. Snort inline checks packets in ip queue and drops them if packets match the descriptions of rules. These descriptions include packet's control information, payloads, TTL, and Flag. Conversely, legitimate packets will be forwarded to their destination.
• Port Disablement: UDP and TCP packets are transmitted from sources' output ports to certain input ports of the destination host. When attacks are detected, packets sent to specific ports of the destination server will be dropped. However, this protection method does not work for ICMP protocol packets, since layer three has no service ports that could be disabled.
• Legitimate Flow Filtering: This protection method does not cut off legitimate or illegitimate network traffic flow as the function of IPS or port disablement. However, legitimate flow filtering does not influence communication between legitimate users and the server. All packets and requests sent to the server must pass the authentication examination. Only requests from registered clients are allowed to process by the host. Since this action protects limited resources of the server and only replies to legitimate requests, legitimate flow filtering is considered as an efficient method to protect the server when the server is under heavy loads.
• Network Disconnection: Disabling the network interface can be used to block network attacks. However as the web server is not connected to the network, no packets are able to be forwarded to the server, legitimate client requests cannot be processed, either. When comparing the impact of implementing network disconnection to the impact of DoS attacks, the loss of client requests may be worse than the loss induced by DoS attacks.
• Host Shutdown: If the host is compromised and it cannot be protected by the methods mentioned above, shutting down the host action is implemented as the last action to protect hardware against the attack. However, the time spent in restarting the host is very long which impacts the host's availability, cost, and latency.
Optimization Unit
This unit evaluates protection methods using a fuzzy logic approach. The total score of each method is calculated and passed to the recovery ranking unit. The following set of metrics is used for recovery action evaluation.
• Recovery Rate: This metric defines the (fuzzy) level in which a protection process is able to recover the host from an attack. In the most optimal situation for the host recovery, the system features (changed during the attacks) are brought by a recovery process x to their normal values. In this case, the value for the metric under process x is set to 0. A value of 0.5 means the process mitigates the attack, but does not result in full recovery to 'Normal' condition. A value of 1 means that the method is not effective at all. IPS, port disablement, network disconnection and host shutdown are methods that directly block UDP attack flow. When the UDP attack flow is blocked, the recovery value is set to 0. Since legitimate flow filter does not eliminate attack flow, the recovery value in this protection method is set to 1 • Availability: This metric characterizes the level at which a protection process influences legitimate client requests to access host resources. For instance, although methods like 'host shutdown', 'port disablement' and 'network disconnection' impede malicious packets passed to host, legitimate packets are rejected as well. If all of legitimate users can send requests to the server normally, a value of 0 for this metric is given for the underlying protection process. On the other hand, a value of 0.5 will be assigned if parts of request packets from legitimate users are dropped similar to illegitimate packets, while the remaining requests from legitimate users are sent to the web server successfully. If all of the requests from legitimate users are blocked, the value 1 is assigned for availability metric.
• Latency: This metric characterizes how fast illegitimate packets are able to be processed as well as how fast the legitimate packets reach the host after implementing protection processes chosen by the controller. One example is Snort inline which checks the packets in ip queue. Packets stored in ip queue are processed only after implementing Snort inline. Thus the latency value can be set to 0.2 because of a queue of packets in ip queue waiting to be analyzed. Port disablement immediately blocks legitimate and illegitimate packets sent to the compromised port of the host. Since the latency of legitimate packets transmission is very long, 0.8 is set to this process.
• Cost: This metric defines the cost of implementing and executing a specific process. Cost also includes the training expense of system administrators. When the cost of implementing and executing a process is relatively low, a value of 0 can be assigned to this metric.
• Resource utilization: The metric characterizes the level of resource utilization used for implementing the protection process. If the CPU or memory utilization rises in range 0%-5%, the value set to the protection process is 0-0.3. From range 5% to 10%, values are between 0.4 and 0.6. If the utilization is higher than 10%, the values are various from 0.7 to 1.
The above metrics can be weighted in a way that reflects their relative importance. In our experiment, the highest weight, 2, is given to the most important metric. The weight for important is 1, while 0.5 means fair, and 0.2 represents not very important. We assign the above metrics the weights of 2, 2, 1, 0.5, and 1, respectively.
The weighted sum of these metrics are then used to evaluate different feasible protection methods and the method with the lowest total score is considered the optimal one and will be used to recover the host system. Values of each parameter are different in each attack. For instance, port disablement is not the optimal protection for UDP flood attack, but it is the most efficient implementation for TCP SYN attacks. Therefore, the values of recovery rate, availability, latency, cost and resource utilization would be different from TCP SYN attacks compared to UDP flood attacks. Table 1 gives an example of controller decision for UDP flood attacks.
Recovery Ranking
Let R denote the set of recovery options, and M be the set of the evaluation metrics as defined earlier. The cost J r of using a recovery option r ∈ R is defined in equation 4, where L r : M → Ê is a map that assigns a value to each metric m i ∈ M . L r reflects its relative level under the recovery action r ∈ R. The relative weight of each metric is represented by w i ∈ Ê. The recovery module sorts methods by their costs as defined above. The best recovery option is the one corresponding to the smallest cost, as defined in equation 5, where O is the optimized protection methods. The example in table 1 shows a situation in which IPS is the best option. The host state used for detecting misclassified attacks or novel attacks is described in Section 3.
Experiment Result
To validate the proposed structure for self-protection of the enterprise system, four types of DoS attacks are simulated. The simulation testbed is a web server system built with IBM Web Sphere Application Server Community Edition with Daytrader [22] Requests sent from clients to the web server vary from 300 to 2000 requests per section and are based on user request workloads of 1998 World Cup Soccer (WCS-98) [24] . Note that the sample time of host is 1 second and the sample time of the front VM is 2 seconds. The four attacks are simulated and are discussed in following sections.
Unknown UDP Flood Attack
To simulate unknown UDP attack, the content of UDP packets, the compromised port, the packet rate, and the total bytes sent to the web server per second vary from known UDP attacks in the training datasets. Although the IDS identifies the suspicious flow as an attack, it cannot decipher which type of attack the flow is. This is because feature values of the novel attack differ from measurements used for training. The IDS at host indicates the host is under attack as shown in Figure 2 . From sample time 50 to 340, the percentage of CPU idle time is decreased rapidly while CPU user and system utilization are increased sharply. Also, the sub-figures for Byte Number and Packet Number illustrate the increases in network utilization from several hundred of bytes (sample time 0-50) to almost 3 * 10 7 bytes. Once the attack is detected, the run-time analysis module dynamically captures signatures of novel attacks and identifies the unknown attack as a UDP flood attack. The corresponding flow is sent to web host's port 5008 with the signature content of UDP flow attacks. In this case, the controller selects IPS as the best option to deal with the UDP flood attack and a new rule is written to the rule file of Snort inline at run-time to filter illegitimate packets. Sample time 170 to 250 in Figure 3 shows that the number of total byte received and packet received on front VM is increased. These samples show that the novel UDP flood attack flows are automatically redirected to the front VM from the router before being forwarded to the host. The controller on the front VM implements the protection process in this period as well. Sample time 340 to 500 in Figure 2 illustrates the host is protected as CPU and network utilization are back to 'Normal'. 
TCP SYN Attack
In this simulation the IDS at VM identifies that VM is 'Normal' (Figure 5 sample time 175 to 275) but the anomaly IDS at the host shows it is under attack (Figure 4 sample time 350 to 550). In this case, the run-time analysis module is executed to detect signatures of unknown attack. By analyzing signatures, such as the payload, destination IP address and the port number by Wireshark [25] , the unknown attack is classified as TCP SYN attack. The controller chooses port disablement to recover the host which is the adapted method provided by the model-based controller. The measurements of total bytes received and the Figure 6 and Figure 7 display the changes of the system features by the influence of POD attacks. The ICMP protocol packets are transmitted in layer three which has no service ports. Therefore, IPTables' rules for ICMP protocol packets redirection do not need to add specific port numbers. All of ICMP packets sent to the host are redirected to the front VM. Consequently, the host state Figure 6 describe the random client requests sent to the host before, during and after POD attacks. The CPU utilization, the memory utilization and the I/O requests are increased and decreased concordantly with the impact of incoming client requests. 
Discussion
Our approach aims to enable self-protection in enterprise systems. The IDS and the controller run automatically and the best protection method to defend against network attacks is selected by the model-based controller. The proposed approach can also be used as a decision support system in which the administrator is guided to choose the best available protection method. For instance, if the administrator prefers to protect against the attack once it is detected, executing 'network disconnection' or 'host shutdown' causes faster recovery speed than applying 'IPS' or 'port disablement'. Another situation is when the administrator chooses 'network disconnection', the controller Figure 7 . Features of front VM for POD attack with random client requests would implement this option regardless of being optimal based on the evaluation criteria. Our system can be used as a fully autonomic security management system as well as a decision support system for the administrator.
The proposed approach not only detects and protects against DoS attack, but can also be extended to protect web server from a variety of network attacks. Worm, virus and Trojan horse attacks can be detected and identified by analyzing the system features mentioned earlier. The recovery unit applies various protection methods and can also be used for protecting other network attacks. One example is Snort inline which is able to protect against eject and buffer overflow attacks because signatures of eject attack packets include '/usr/bin/eject', '/ejectexploit', './eject' are easy to be filtered. Snort inline can also deal with buffer overflow attacks which have large header and sequence of symbols [11] . Another example is SQL injection attacks transmitted by network packets. The special contents of SQL injection packets have symbols like "select *", "' or '1'='1" can be detected by regular expression technique. Illegitimate packets of SQL injection attacks are filtered by Snort inline predefined rules.
The front virtual machine is one of the most significant parts in the security management structure. If attackers learn the system structure and successfully compromise the front VM, the security management structure would be destroyed and the self-protection attribute would be difficult to complete. Therefore, protecting the front VM against attacks is a crucial task for the enterprise system, too. Efficient protection methods, such as IPS and port disablement are able to filter intrusions. As a result, both front VM and host in our system are protected to guarantee the whole management system is secure.
Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper we introduced an efficient security management approach. The proposed approach detects and classifies attacks using data mining methodologies and then selects the best protection method to defend against host at-tacks using fuzzy control techniques. The run-time analysis module is applied to examine real time packets signatures caused by novel attacks. Accordingly our approach can detect and protect host against known and unknown network attacks. Our approach is easy to install and configure, supports a wide variety of hardware and operating systems, and provides system protection even under a partially compromised conditions. Although our approach only validates four types of DoS attacks, it can also be deployed to protect web server automatically from a variety of network attacks.
In the future, we plan to address flash events [26] and distinguish it from DoS attacks to protect server against heavy legitimate loads. We will also simulate a wide range of well known network attacks such as worms, viruses, Trojan horses, buffer overflow attacks, and SQL injection attacks to validate the applicability of our approach for these classes of attacks. Training sets will be updated dynamically for analyzing real time novel attacks. We will also work to improve the speed of attack detection and protection using, for instance, more efficient distributed data mining algorithms.
